Presidential Signing Statements in Perspective by Lund, Nelson
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 16 | Issue 1 Article 8
Presidential Signing Statements in Perspective
Nelson Lund
Copyright c 2007 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Nelson Lund, Presidential Signing Statements in Perspective, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 95 (2007),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol16/iss1/8
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS IN PERSPECTIVE
Nelson Lund*
Presidential signing statements that object to putatively unconstitutional statutory
provisions, or interpret them to avoid constitutional difficulties, have long been common
and occasionally controversial. After an outburst of sensational journalism last year,'
the American Bar Association (ABA) followed up with a report accusing President
Bush of using these statements to threaten what it called "the rule of law and our
constitutional system of separation of powers."2 In this brief symposium contri-
bution, I hope to indicate why the ABA's position is analytically untenable and
irresponsibly hyperbolic, and also to raise a more interesting set of questions about
the similarities and differences between the ways that courts and Presidents do and
should go about the task of interpreting the Constitution and laws.
I. THE ABA REPORT
The key conclusion in the ABA Report is that the President has what the
authors call a "constitutional obligation to veto any bill that he believes violates the
* Patrick Henry Professor of Constitutional Law and the Second Amendment, George
Mason University School of Law. This piece is based on remarks delivered on February 3,
2007, at an exceptionally well-organized symposium-"The Last Word? The Constitutional
Implications of Presidential Signing Statements"--co-sponsored by the William & Mary Bill
of Rights Journal and the Institute of Bill of Rights Law. For helpful comments on an earlier
draft, I am grateful to Michelle Boardman, John 0. McGinnis, Lee Liberman Otis, and Michael
B. Rappaport.
l See Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, April 30,
2006, at Al.
2 AM. BAR Ass'N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 5 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signing
statements/abafinalstatementsrecommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf. The passage from which
the quoted words are drawn purports to warn the reader not to view the Report as an attack on
the current President, but I do not believe that the document as a whole can reasonably be
viewed as anything other than exactly that. Id. The Report's description of President Bush's
practices is noticeably more censorious than its description of practices in previous adminis-
trations. See id. at 7-18. And the discussion of the current administration ends with several in-
flammatory quotations from a "learned commentator" who must be among the most uninhibited
critics of Bush's use of signing statements. See id. at 18 (quoting Phillip J. Cooper, George
W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of Presidential Signing Statements, 35
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 515, 530 (2005)).
The ABA House of Delegates adopted the Report's recommendations. The Clock is
Ticking: House Decides Time is Right to Oppose 'Misuse' of Presidential Signing Statements,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 2006, at 59.
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Constitution in whole or in part.' 3 When a President signs a bill but announces that he
regards some provision in it as unconstitutional and unenforceable, or interprets the pro-
vision in a manner inconsistent with what the authors call "the will of Congress," the
Report contends that he is exercising an unconstitutional line-item veto.4 The authors
accuse President Bush of engaging in this lawless behavior on a massive scale.5
The Bush administration counters that the President is obliged to defend the
Constitution against Congress and stresses its claim that Bush is not behaving differ-
ently in any significant way from many of his predecessors, including Bill Clinton.6
This claim appears plausible, and it may well be true, but it is not easy to assess
exactly how much continuity actually exists.' Comparing the Bush record with that
of previous Presidents is a laborious undertaking, and some important data may not
be publicly available.
Absent a detailed study of the evidence, one might be tempted to dismiss the
Bush administration's protestations as a lot of patently self-serving rhetoric, especially
when one looks at the ABA Report's star-studded roster of signatories: the dean of
the Yale Law School; a former dean of Stanford Law School; a former chief judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; a former
Director of the FBI, who is also a former chief judge of a federal district court; a
Harvard Law School professor; a professor from the George Washington University
Law School; and a lecturer at Princeton University; along with a number of prominent
practitioners and pundits.8 Could so many highly regarded representatives of the elite
legal establishment be completely off base? If so, is it perhaps possible that the ABA
Report was driven primarily by political animus against Bush rather than by any real
study of the Constitution or concern for the rule of law?
Maybe.9 It is not just Bush administration spokesmen and their conservative
allies"° who have disputed the ABA Report. A number of prominent Democrats have
3 AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 22 (emphasis added).
4 Id. at 20, 22.
' See id. at 14-18.
6 The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Michelle Boardman, Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen.) [hereinafter Boardman Statement]; Presidential Signing Statements Under the Bush
Administration: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (state-
ment of John P. Elwood, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.).
7 For a good discussion of these points, see Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presi-
dential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307,321-34(2006).
8 For the names and biographical sketches of the signatories, see AM. BAR AsS'N, supra
note 2, at 29-34.
9 For a thoughtful discussion of the mistakes that can arise when one carelessly assumes
that public statements by legal scholars necessarily reflect either actual expertise or dis-
passionate analysis, see Neal Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and
the Future ofAcademic Freedom, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 165 (1999).
10 See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, The Separation of Powers: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld-The
Anti-Roberts, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 573, 585-90 (2007); Timothy E. Flanigan et al., Separation
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attacked the Report as well-including Laurence Tribe and several former Clinton ad-
ministration officials, the most prominent of whom is Walter Dellinger. " According
to these critics, the ABA is fundamentally misguided in its claim that no President is
permitted by the Constitution to declare that he will refuse to enforce unconstitutional
provisions in bills that he signs into law. These critics regard the ABA Report's focus
on signing statements as an attack on what Professor Tribe calls a "phantom target."12
So far as I am aware, the signatories of the ABA Report have not pointed out any
flaws in the arguments of these Democratic critics. And I think it is safe to say that
when Professors Tribe and Dellinger feel obliged to denounce an attack on the Bush
administration, that attack probably occupies a region of ideological space populated
by very few self-evident truths. 3
The dominating error in the ABA Report, in my view and in that of the Democratic
critics, is the notion that the President must either veto a bill that contains even one
minor provision that he regards as unconstitutional or enforce the objectionable pro-
vision. 14 Which clause of the Constitution imposes this choice on the President? The
ABA Report suggests two answers, neither of which can withstand scrutiny.
First, the Report appears to characterize a President's refusal to enforce uncon-
stitutional provisions in statutes signed by himself as the exercise of a line-item veto
and thus a violation of the Presentment Clause. 5 The Presentment Clause, however,
of Powers, ABA Style: "Signing Statements" Report at Odds with Constitution, WASH. LEGAL
FouND. LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 22, 2006, available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/
092206flanigan.pdf; THE FEDERALIST SOC'Y, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS (2006),
available at http://www.fed-sac.org/doclib/2007032 1_PresidentialSigningStatements.pdf;
Ed Whelan, ABA Report on Presidential Signing Statements: A Critique, NAT'LREV. BENCH
MEMOS, July 24, 2006, http://bench.nationalreview.com/post/?q=Mzk2NDYOOWY2YTdj
ZTYwZWV1MDglMzJMzljYThlNDY=.
" See Walter Dellinger, Op-Ed, A Slip of the Pen, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2006, at A17;
Posting of Martin Lederman, Untangling the Debate on Signing Statements, to Georgetown
Law Faculty Blog, http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetownuniversity_law/2006/07/thanksto
hep.html (July 31, 2006) (post co-written by eight former officials in the Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel); Posting of Laurence Tribe, Larry Tribe on the ABA Signing
Statements Report, to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/08/larry-tribe-on-aba-
signing-statements.html (Aug. 6, 2006, 8:00 PM).
12 Tribe, supra note 11. Focusing on this "phantom" creates a distraction from what the
Democratic critics regard as the real problem, which is that the substance of some of Bush's
interpretations of the Constitution-especially those involving the scope of the President's
constitutional powers-is, in their view, fundamentally and dangerously wrong.
"3 Whether the Democrats who have attacked the ABA Report are also right in their substan-
tive disagreements with the Bush administration is, of course, a completely different question.
Addressing that question would require an extended and detailed examination of the substantive
issues involved, which I will not attempt here.
14 See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 23-24.
15 See id. at 18 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2). I agree with the ABA Report's claim
that the line-item veto is unconstitutional. See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office
of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 437,456 n.46 (1993). Unfortunately, the Report chose
2007]
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simply gives the President the option of returning an unsatisfactory bill to Congress
for reconsideration, along with two other options, namely approving the bill or doing
nothing. 6 By its terms, the Presentment Clause imposes no obligation to veto any
bill, whether for constitutional or policy reasons, and it says nothing at all about the
existence, scope, or nature of a President's obligations with respect to the enforcement
of enacted statutes.'7 The Presentment Clause does not tell us that signing a bill and
then refusing to enforce an unconstitutional provision is an illegal line-item veto any
more than it tells us that refusing to enforce an unconstitutional statute is an illegal
executive repeal.
In what appears to be a second effort to ground its conclusions in the Constitution's
text, the ABA Report proclaims, "[b]ecause the 'take care' obligation of the President
requires him to faithfully execute all laws, his obligation is to veto bills he believes
are unconstitutional. He may not sign them into law and then emulate King James II
by refusing to enforce them."' 8 Leaving aside the overwrought comparison of American
Presidents to a deposed British monarch, 9 this statement confuses questions about the
President's obligation to execute the laws with the question of whether he is obligated
to veto bills he believes are unconstitutional. Like the Presentment Clause, the Take
Care Clause by its terms imposes no obligation on the President to veto any bill.2°
Nor does the Take Care Clause purport to determine what the President should do
when one law (say, a statute) conflicts with another (such as the Constitution).
The ABA Report's claim that Presidents are constitutionally required faithfully to
execute all laws, moreover, has some strange implications. Were Presidents Adams and
Jefferson, for example, constitutionally obligated to enforce the Sedition Act of 1798
against critics of the government? Was President Andrew Johnson constitutionally
to rely for this proposition on the Supreme Court's dubious opinion in Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), which in my view was convincingly refuted by the dissenting opin-
ions (especially Justice Breyer's). It is possible to imagine a dishonest President attempting to
approximate a line-item veto by pretending to have constitutional objections to a statutory pro-
vision to which he actually objects only on policy grounds. It is unlikely that any disinterested
observer would defend such conduct, but the ABA Report is clearly not addressed to this
special, and one hopes only hypothetical, case.
6 Doing nothing may result either in the bill becoming law or being subjected to the so-
called pocket veto. See Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929) (defining a pocket veto as one
in which the President neither signs nor vetoes the bill, and the bill does not become law be-
cause the congressional term ends within ten days of presentment).
17 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
18 AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 2, at 19 (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3
(requiring that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed").
19 For a useful discussion comparing the prerogative power to suspend statutes that British
monarchs once claimed with the American practice of presidential refusals to enforce some stat-
utes on constitutional grounds, see J. Randy Beck, Book Review, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 419
(1999) (reviewing CHRIsTOPHERN. MAY, PRESIDENTIALDEFiANcEOF"UNCONSTITUTIONAL"
LAWS: REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE (1998)).
20 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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obligated to comply with the Tenure of Office Act? The ABA Report appears to be
quite equivocal about such issues. Contradicting the statement about "all laws" quoted
above,21 the Report elsewhere leaves open the possibility that it would be permissible
"if the President, in the absence of a signing statement, nevertheless fails to enforce
a law enacted under his or an earlier administration. 22 Do the authors really mean
to suggest that it is impermissible for the President to say that he has the right to re-
frain from enforcing a statute, even if he never exercises that right, but that it is per-
missible for him actually to refuse to enforce a statute that he signed so long as he has
not announced that he is going to do so in a signing statement? If the ABA Report
did not mean to adopt so absurd a position, it failed to explain how the inference can
be avoided.23
Furthermore, do the authors of the ABA Report truly believe that the President
must "veto any bill he believes would violate the Constitution in any respect"?24 As
Edward Hartnett points out, this seems to mean that if President Washington believed
that section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional in certain appli-
cations, as Marbury later held,25 he was required to veto the bill.26 The Report does
refer at one point to what it calls the "rare possibility" of urgent legislation containing
an unconstitutional provision.27 How rare? The Report's only example, given imme-
diately after the allusion to a "rare possibility," consists of a reference to "the many
bills" containing unconstitutional legislative vetoes.28 Whatever its authors mean
by "rare," the ABA Report recommends that in such circumstances the President
and Congress cooperate "in obtaining timely judicial review regarding the provision
in dispute.,
2 9
21 AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 2, at 19.
22 Id. at 27 (emphasis added); cf id. at 20 (urging President Bush to "cease the practice of
using presidential signing statements to state his intention to disregard or decline to enforce a
law or to interpret it in a manner inconsistent with the will of Congress" (emphasis added)).
23 Nor was I able to advance my understanding of this aspect of the ABA Report during
a discussion I had at the Symposium with Mark Agrast, one of the Report's signatories. See
Podcast: William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Symposium: The Last Word? Constitutional
Implications of Presidential Signing Statements (Feb. 3, 2007) (http://www.wm.edu/so/borj/
symposium/symposium07.html) [hereinafter Symposium Podcast] (colloquy beginning at
about 1:08:40).
24 AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 22 (emphasis added).
25 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). President Washington, I should
note, could easily have believed that section 13, properly interpreted, was perfectly consistent
with Article III of the Constitution, properly interpreted.
26 Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial
Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735, 1747 &
n.67 (2006).
27 AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 23.
28 Id.
29 Id. As discussed below, the Supreme Court has declared legislative vetoes unconstitu-
tional, yet Congress continues to pass "many bills" containing these devices. The authors of
the ABA Report do not explain why they think, or appear to think, that the President is required
20071
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The ABA Report's reference to judicial review as a solution to the problem of
disagreements between Congress and the President brings us to the questions that I
would like to examine a little more closely. Do Presidents approach the task of inter-
preting the Constitution in a way that is fundamentally different from the approach
of the courts? And should they?
I. PROFESSOR RAPPAPORT'S OBJECTIONS TO CONSTITUTIONAL
SIGNING STATEMENTS
Before taking up those questions, I should note that it is possible to criticize
Presidents for the way they have used signing statements without treating judicial re-
view as the best solution to serious inter-branch disputes. At the Symposium, Professor
Michael Rappaport argued that it is always unconstitutional for a President to sign a
bill and then refuse to enforce it.3" As I understood him, Professor Rappaport began
with the premise that a President can refuse to enforce a statute only if he believes that
the Constitution forbids him to do so.3 Given that premise, Professor Rappaport
concluded that it is inconsistent for a President to approve a bill creating a law that
he believes it would be illegal for him to enforce.32
This is an interesting argument, one of whose most salient features is how narrow
it is. On the one hand, it seems to leave open the possibility that the Constitution does
not in truth compel the President to refuse to enforce or comply with statutes that
he believes are unconstitutional. But if a President is mistaken in believing he is for-
bidden to enforce certain statutes, it is hard for me to see what would be gained by
demanding that he make other decisions consistent with this mistaken belief. On the
other hand, Professor Rappaport's argument leaves Presidents free to refuse enforce-
ment of unconstitutional statutes that they did not sign, perhaps including statutes that
they allowed to be enacted without their signature. But why should it be important
to distinguish with respect to enforcement or non-enforcement among statutes depend-
ing on who signed them or what procedural route they took through the formalities of
enactment? I also think that Professor Rappaport's argument must leave a President
free to enforce a statute he approved in cases where he recognizes the constitutional
problem with the statute only after he has signed it into law. Here again, I cannot
see why an identical statute should be enforceable or not depending on whether a
President recognizes its unconstitutionality before or after he signs it into law.
to ask the courts to repeat themselves over and over again about the unconstitutionality of the
legislative veto.
30 See Michael B. Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality of "Signing and Not Enforcing,"
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 113 (2007); see also Michael B. Rappaport, The President's
Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 735, 771-76 (1993).
31 Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality of "Signing and Not Enforcing, " supra note 30,
at 114.
32 Id. at 119-20.
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Furthermore, even if one accepted the claim that it is unconstitutional for a
President to sign a bill that he believes is unconstitutional, it does not follow that it is
unconstitutional for him to refuse to enforce it. If the Constitution forbids the President
to enforce an unconstitutional statute, that command could not be revoked by virtue of
the President's previous constitutional mistake in signing the bill. The second wrong
would not make the first one right. And the first wrong could not make the second
one obligatory. Thus, the putatively unconstitutional initial mistake would seem to
be at worst a harmless error as far as that President's behavior is concerned.
Thus, Professor Rappaport's claim is extremely narrow: a President who believes
that it is unconstitutional for him to enforce unconstitutional statutes is forbidden by
the Constitution to sign any bill that he believes he will be required on that ground
to refrain from enforcing. Notwithstanding how narrow this conclusion is, it seems
to me to be mistaken. A President could take the plausible formalist position that an
unconstitutional statutory provision is not a law no matter who may have purported
to enact or approve it. A President's signature on a piece of paper purporting to create
an unconstitutional statute would then have no necessary legal effect, and the President
would, in my view, be guilty of no inconsistency if he announced in a signing statement
that some provision of a bill he signed was unconstitutional and therefore a nullity."3
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATIONS
Reflecting what I think is the conventional view, the ABA assumes that the
President and the courts have fundamentally different roles in dealing with consti-
tutionally problematic statutes. Its report proclaims, as though rehearsing the obvious:
"Definitive constitutional interpretations are entrusted to an independent and im-
partial Supreme Court, not a partisan and interested President. That is the meaning
of Marbury v. Madison."'  This faith in judicial virtue, or at least in the virtue of
judicial supremacy, may explain why the authors of the Report are so offended by
the thought that the President might have what they call "the last word" on which
statutes will go unenforced because they are unconstitutional.35
Things cannot be quite this simple, and the conventionally reflexive invocation
of judicial supremacy deserves closer scrutiny than it sometimes receives. The
" Professor Rappaport also suggested that practical considerations support a rule requiring
Presidents to veto every bill that they believe contains an unconstitutional provision. See id. at
126-27. For reasons that I will sketch out later in Part III, I do not agree that practical
considerations justify a blanket rule of this type.
34 AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 23.
" Id. at 20; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Problem with Presidential Signing Statements,
CHI. TRIB., July 16,2006, at 5 ("Modern understanding ofjudicial review requires the executive
branch to take its marching orders from the Supreme Court. Signing statements, I fear, could
be the opening wedge to a presidential posture that judicial decisions may limit the President's
ability to use courts to enforce his policies, but cannot stop him from acting unilaterally.").
2007]
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Constitution nowhere says that "definitive constitutional interpretations" are entrusted
to the Supreme Court. The Constitution nowhere says that only the Court may have
"the last word" about the meaning of the Constitution. And there is no reason at all
to assume a priori that judges are more impartial and disinterested than Presidents
when it comes to deciding how much power they think the Constitution gives them.
If anything, the self-evident fact is that Supreme Court Justices are not impartial angels
incapable of overreaching with respect to their own power.
In any event, the authors of the ABA Report are wrong about Marbury v. Madison,
which nowhere made the sweeping claim of judicial supremacy attributed to it by
the Report. 36 If anything, Marbury actually undermines the ABA's attack on presi-
dential signing statements. The most logically powerful argument for judicial review
in Marbury is this: faced with a conflict between the Constitution and a statute, courts
have no choice except to give effect to the more authoritative of the two laws.37 That
logic applies to the President every bit as much as it applies to the Court.
But perhaps even more significantly, nobody on the Supreme Court has ever
actually accepted the implications of Marbury's powerful logic. Any Justice who
did so would have to conclude that conflicts between the Constitution and judicial
precedent must always be resolved by giving effect to the Constitution, not the prece-
dent. After all, if statutes enacted by the people's representatives are always trumped
by the Constitution, it would seem to follow a fortiori that mere judicial opinions-
which are not even mentioned in the Supremacy Clause as a source of law 3 -must
also be trumped by the Constitution every time. However logically compelling this
conclusion may appear to be, I do not believe any Justice has ever accepted it, at least
not consistently.
In practice, the Supreme Court has developed a very complex and flexible approach
to the exercise of judicial review. There is almost no one who would seriously main-
tain today that the courts are obliged by the Constitution to give effect to unconstitu-
tional statutes. But it is also true that very few would seriously maintain that courts
are always obliged to strike down statutes they think are unconstitutional, even in
the face of thoroughly settled precedent and notwithstanding the enormous reliance
interests that are often based on such precedents.39
36 The ABA Report could have cited Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) Cooper states
that Marbury "declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition
of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and
the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." Citing
Cooper, however, would not have made the ABA's interpretation of Marbury less wrong.
17 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
38 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ).
'9 Cf Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation ofJudicial Decision-
Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 194 (2001) ("[Michael Stokes Paulsen] and I are among
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Presidents, it seems to me, do and should take the same general position that the
courts have taken. In principle, Presidents always have the option of refusing to enforce
or comply with statutes they consider unconstitutional. But they are not obliged to ig-
nore or defy every such statute, and the same goes for Congress. While its individual
members may have a duty to refrain from voting for bills they regard as unconstitu-
tional,"o the body has no obligation to seek relentlessly to impose its own constitu-
tional views on either of the other branches of the federal government or the states.
One might think that leaving the President, the Court, and Congress with concur-
rent authority to decide on the meaning of the Constitution is an invitation to consti-
tutional crises and, ultimately, to chaos. History demonstrates that this is not so, and
the ABA Report's example of the legislative veto provides a useful illustration.41
An early controversy over the legislative veto occurred in 1941 when Congress
passed the Lend-Lease bill.42 This gave the President certain new powers but provided
that those powers would terminate if both houses of Congress passed a concurrent
resolution declaring that the President no longer needed the powers for the defense
of the nation. Attorney General Robert Jackson believed that the provision at issue
could be regarded as a perfectly permissible limitation by which the new powers would
expire on the contingency of a concurrent resolution, just as new powers can (and
indeed in this case did) expire on a certain date. President Roosevelt disagreed, be-
lieving the provision authorized the repeal of a statute by concurrent resolution and
thus constituted an unconstitutional congressional effort to evade the President's
veto power.
Roosevelt badly wanted the new powers conferred by the Lend-Lease bill and did
not want to veto it. Furthermore, he was in an awkward political position because the
bill's opponents in Congress had claimed the legislative veto made the bill unconstitu-
tional while the President's supporters had taken the opposite position. If Roosevelt
had publicized his view of the legislative veto, it would have embarrassed his supporters
and given his opponents a political windfall. In the end, the President signed the bill.
But he also overruled the Attorney General, signed his own legal opinion declaring
the legislative veto unconstitutional, and solved his immediate political problem by
keeping this presidential legal opinion a secret.
The subsequent history of the legislative veto reflects continuing disagreements
over its constitutionality. Congress continued to include the device in many bills,
and Presidents continued to denounce it on constitutional grounds." The Carter and
the tiny handful of academics who think it is affirmatively unconstitutional for federal courts to
rely on precedent in constitutional cases.").
4 I express no opinion on this question.
41 See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 9-14.
42 The story summarized below is told in Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion,
66 HARv. L. REv. 1353 (1953).
43 For a review of the history, see Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the
Modem Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REv. 601 (2005).
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Reagan administrations mounted a legal challenge, which came to fruition when
INS v. Chadha struck down the legislative veto by a divided vote.' Congress, how-
ever, has stubbornly refused to accept the Supreme Court's decision and has routinely
included legislative veto provisions in bills presented to the President.45 Presidents,
in turn, have refused to accept the views of Congress and have routinely employed
signing statements to declare these provisions unenforceable.46
Each of the three branches of government has a plausible legal argument to
support its position, and each branch has stuck to its guns. And yet, there has been
no constitutional crisis, let alone constitutional chaos. Why not? The answer is that
all of the actors involved have thought that the issue was important enough that they
should not surrender their claims but not so important that they should provoke a
serious confrontation.
Let us start with the executive branch. Notwithstanding many presidential decla-
rations that legislative vetoes are legally inoperative, administrations of both parties
have almost certainly complied with the overwhelming majority of these provisions.47
And that should not be surprising when one considers the extremely powerful in-
formal tools that Congress can and does use to enforce its will.48 Those on the Hill,
for their part, have little reason to care overly much what Presidents say about the
legislative veto so long as they comply in fact with congressional dictates. And the
Justices have been careful, in Chadha and elsewhere, to refrain from interfering with
the powerful informal mechanisms that Congress routinely uses to enforce the legis-
lative vetoes that it really cares about.49
With respect to who gets the "last word" on the meaning of the Constitution and
other laws, the simple fact is that each branch of government sometimes gets the last
word and sometimes does not. The courts, for example, have all kinds of devices by
which they avoid trying to become the last word on everything. Obvious examples
include a plethora of doctrines involving such matters as standing, advisory opinions,
the political question doctrine (a version of which can be found in Marbury itself),5 °
4 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
41 See Neal Devins, How Constitutional Law Casebooks Perpetuate the Myth of Judicial
Supremacy, 3 GREEN BAG 2d 259, 261 (2000) (noting that more than three hundred legislative
vetoes have been enacted since Chadha was decided).
' According to one count, for example, the current President pointed to legislative vetoes
in 47 of the first 110 signing statements in which he raised constitutional objections. Boardman
Statement, supra note 6.
47 See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest
Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 109, 115 (1996).
48 For a good discussion of congressional enforcement methods, see Louis Fisher, The
Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 273,
284-91.
49 See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 n. 19.
0 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Chevron deference,51 various decisions involving executive and legislative immuni-
ties, and countless rulings that give the so-called political branches broad discretion
to decide how far they should go in exercising vaguely worded powers like those con-
ferred in the Sweeping Clause of Article 152 and the Vesting Clause of Article H.
53
Presidents have behaved much like the Court, though in a somewhat less con-
spicuous way. Over the years, the Justice Department has developed an elaborate
internal jurisprudence that largely follows, and even mimics, the Supreme Court. That
jurisprudence displays a certain amount of independence, especially with respect to
matters directly touching on the President's institutional interests, such as the scope
of his Article II authority. But the jurisprudence is memorialized in written legal opin-
ions that take judicial decisions very seriously and treat them as dispositive on many
issues. In addition, interpretive techniques that have sometimes generated controversy
when used by the Executive-such as the practice of construing statutes so as to avoid
constitutional difficulties-are generally borrowed directly from the courts. 4 Nor
is it obvious that Justice Department opinions and presidential signing statements
are more likely than Supreme Court opinions to employ far-fetched, result-oriented
legal analysis."
It is important to keep in mind that these Justice Department opinions are purely
advisory so far as the President is concerned. He is free to ignore or overrule them, as
President Roosevelt did in 1941,56 and as other Presidents have sometimes done since
that time. And perhaps most important, Presidents have not felt compelled to exercise
every right they believe they have. 7 There is a fundamentally important distinction
51 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress power to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof').
53 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.").
5' For somejustifiably controversial examples of the Supreme Court's use of the "avoidance
canon," see Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep 't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989); NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
" See Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, ABAndoning the Constitution: Judging the
President and Justices on Executive Power, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, Aug. 10, 2006, available
at http://mason.gmu.edu/-nlund/Pubs/NatlRevOnlineSigningStatements.pdf.
56 See supra text following note 42.
57 This is not to say, of course, that Presidents never refuse to enforce or comply with stat-
utes they consider unconstitutional. But actual defiance appears to be historically rare. See,
e.g., Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REv. 17,47-48
(discussing Appointments Clause issue in the National and Community Service Act of 1990);
Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal
Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865,945-69 (1994) (discussing twelve episodes from
1860 to 1981); Christopher S. Kelley, A Comparative Look at the Constitutional Signing
Statement: The Case of Bush and Clinton, at 12-13, 22-24, available at http://mpsa.indiana
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between claiming the authority to do something and actually doing it. President Bush
himself grasps the difference, perhaps better than some of his supposedly more sophis-
ticated critics. That much, at least, is suggested by his extemporaneous comment at
a public press conference:
I signed the appropriations bill with the McCain [anti-torture] amendment
attached on because that's the way it is. I know some have said, well,
why did he put a qualifier in there? And one reason why presidents put
qualifiers in is to protect the prerogative of the executive branch. You
see, what we're always doing is making sure that we make it clear that
the executive branch has got certain responsibilities. Conducting war is
a responsibility in the executive branch, not the legislative branch.
But make no mistake about it, the McCain amendment is an amendment
we strongly support and will make sure it's fully effective.58
We all need to keep President Bush's commonsense point in mind when evalu-
ating alarmist rhetoric like that found in the ABA Report. Bush may be using his
signing statements to articulate a very expansive view of presidential power some-
what more aggressively and systematically than his predecessors did, especially in
connection with national security matters. But how much of this is limited to ex-
pressing his administration's constitutional views, and how much of it has led to
actual defiance of statutes? 59 When I did a detailed study of the George H.W. Bush
.edu/conf2003papers/1031858822.pdf (unpublished manuscript, presented to the Midwest
Political Science Association on April 3-6, 2003, discussing two examples from the George
H.W. Bush administration and one arguable example from the Clinton administration).
58 Press Conference of the President, Jan. 26,2006, transcriptavailable athttp://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2006/01/print/20060126.html. What Bush called a "qualifier" was
a pretty mild reservation, in which he noted that he would construe the McCain Amendment
"in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President... as Commander
in Chief [to] assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President...
of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks." Statement on Signing the
Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in
the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006,41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918,
1919 (Dec. 30, 2005).
51 In recent decades, lawyers involved in providing advice to Republican Presidents (and
academics who had previously been so involved during Republican administrations) have
generally taken a broader view than their Democratic counterparts of the President's consti-
tutional authority to refuse to enforce statutes because of constitutional objections. For a review
of the literature, see Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally
Objectionable Statutes, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 7. Democratic and
Republican Presidents, however, do not appear to have differed markedly in their willingness
to engage in actual non-enforcement.
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administration's jurisprudence of presidential power, I found that the President had
been quite aggressive in publicly claiming constitutional authority and extremely
timid about actually exercising the powers he claimed to have.6" Could the same
thing be happening today?
IV. THE GAO REPORT ON BUSH ADMINISTRATION COMPLIANCE PRACTICES
After the Democrats took control of Congress in 2007, the chairmen of the House
and Senate Appropriations Committees asked the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to conduct a study of the current administration's treatment of statutory pro-
visions to which the President had objected in his signing statements.6 ' The most
striking result of this important research project was the GAO's inability to find that
the Bush administration failed to comply with even a single statutory provision as a
result of objections articulated in a presidential signing statement.62
After collecting 160 provisions in fiscal year 2006 appropriations acts to which
President Bush had raised constitutional objections in signing statements, the GAO
identified a sample of nineteen provisions for further investigation.63 The GAO then
queried the relevant executive branch agencies in order to determine whether the
administration had complied with the provisions, and if not, why not.' Unlike prior
researchers, the GAO has the power to compel agencies to answer such queries.
The GAO study does have some methodological limitations. Most important,
the authors did not attempt to assess compliance with certain categories of statutory
provisions, including those in which national security or foreign relations concerns
would have made it difficult even for the GAO to acquire the necessary information.65
Because President Bush's most controversial and potentially significant claims of con-
stitutional authority have often involved these areas, it is possible that particularly
numerous or important instances of executive non-compliance with statutory com-
mands may have been shielded from the GAO's scrutiny.
Another potential shortcoming involves the method by the which the nineteen
provisions were chosen for detailed study. The GAO appears to have tried to select a
representative sample by choosing at least one provision from each appropriations act
and at least one presidential objection from each of several substantive categories.66
o See Lund, supra note 57, at 83-86.
61 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS
ACCOMPANYING THE FISCAL YEAR 2006 APPROPRIATIONS ACTS (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/308603.pdf.
62 See id. at 9, 20.
63 Id. at 1.
64 Id. at 15.
65 Id. at 14.
66 Id. at 15.
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This may have produced a representative sample, but a more reliable approach would
have been to randomize the selection process.67
Even with these limitations, the GAO study adds very considerably to what had
previously been a literature based almost entirely on anecdotes and relatively un-
systematic forms of research. As noted above, the GAO was unable to identify any
instances where the constitutional objections articulated in a presidential signing
statement could be shown to have caused an executive agency to refuse to comply
with a statutory provision.6' Among the nineteen provisions that were examined,
the GAO did conclude that six of them were not executed by the relevant agency in
accordance with the statute's written terms.69 Judging from the GAO's discussions
of these six provisions, 70 however, I believe it is unlikely that the agencies' behavior
was affected by the President's constitutional objections.
In one of the six cases, the GAO report seems to have misclassified the agency's
behavior as a failure to comply. In response to a statutory provision purporting to re-
quire approval from the appropriations committees before certain funds could be trans-
ferred from one use to another, the agency followed a longstanding practice of notifying
the committees of an intent to make the transfer absent committee objections.7' It seems
fairly apparent that this procedure resulted in implicit approval from the committees
and, therefore, that the agency in fact did comply with the statutory dictate.
Although less clear, one other case may also have involved implicit approval. A
statutory provision required the agency to obtain committee approval before incurring
obligations above a specified level.72 On three separate occasions during the fiscal
year, the agency exceeded the specified level after notifying the committees of its
plans to do so." The repetitive pattern suggests that the committees were implicitly
approving the agency's decisions.
In a third case, an agency was seventeen days late in filing a report to Congress
"due to a delay in staffing."74 Such bureaucratic failures to meet deadlines are prob-
ably quite common, and nothing in the GAO report suggests that any constitutional
principle was involved in this case.
In two cases, agencies appear to have concluded, quite possibly with the informal
agreement of the relevant committees, that complying with certain statutory require-
ments was impracticable and/or inconsistent with the spirit of the statute. In one of
67 The GAO report does not explain why the provisions were not chosen at random, but it
is easy to imagine that the choice of methodology may have been driven by resource constraints.
See id. at 13-15.
8 See id. at 9, 20.
69 Id. at 9.
70 Id. at 10.
71 Id. at 31.
72 Id. at 28.
73 id.
74 ld. at 27.
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these cases, the statute required the Defense Department to include in the President's
budget submission cost estimates for a variety of ongoing military operations." The
agency did provide such estimates for some operations but did not comply in two in-
stances where it believed that a timely estimate "would have been flawed" because
of battlefield uncertainties.76 In another case, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency failed to provide a certain type of proposal and expenditure plan because the
agency did not operate the kind of program to which such plans are pertinent.77 In both
of these cases, it seems that the agency would have behaved as it did whether or not
the President had constitutional objections to the statutory provisions in question.
The sixth case is the one most likely to have involved some sort of deliberate
defiance of congressional will, but even here the agency probably behaved exactly
as it would have behaved in the absence of the President's constitutional objections
to the statutory requirement. The appropriations statute provided that the "Border
Patrol shall relocate its checkpoints in the Tucson sector at least once every seven
days in a manner designed to prevent persons subject to inspection from predicting
the location of any such checkpoint. 78 Although the agency appears to have had
no objection to the goal of this provision, and noted that it does relocate checkpoints
frequently, it concluded that adhering to the rigid statutory timetable would in some
cases prove counterproductive.79 The agency also noted that relocating checkpoints
was sometimes impossible because no alternative sites had been coordinated with state
authorities, 0 and its response to this situation is interesting. According to the agency,
these checkpoints were "often shut down for a 'short period in an endeavor to satisfy
the advisory provision' of the statute.81 The use of the term "advisory provision" in
referring to statutory language that was plainly mandatory suggests that the agency
was aware that the President's signing statement so characterized the provision. But
it is also quite possible that the agency adopted the President's characterization only
in the course of responding to the GAO' s inquiry, rather than in the course (months
earlier) of deciding how to respond to the statute itself. This seems to be the likely
explanation when one considers the fact that the agency carried out brief, operation-
ally insignificant shutdowns in an attempt to comply with the literal meaning of the
statute. Such pro forma compliance would have been quite unnecessary if the agency
were relying on the President's "advisory provision" theory, and it almost certainly
would have been useless in satisfying those in Congress who wanted to impose the
71 Id. at 24.
76 id.
77 Id. at 28-29.
78 Id. at 34.
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seven-day relocation rule. For these reasons, it seems unlikely that the President's
constitutional objections to the mandatory seven-day rule played any part at all in
the agency's decisions about how to respond to the statutory language.
Thus, these six examples are all quite consistent with the proposition that ex-
ecutive failures to comply with statutory directives are almost never dictated by the
President's constitutional reservations and with the expectation that such failures
will rarely even be influenced by such reservations. Further research may some day
paint a different picture about the effects of presidential signing statements, but the
evidence currently available suggests that much ado is being made about a practice
that amounts in practical terms to very little.
CONCLUSION
Like many others who follow the Supreme Court, I think it has often misinter-
preted the Constitution, sometimes badly and even inexcusably. I also disagree with
a number of interpretations of the Constitution set forth in Justice Department opinions
and presidential signing statements. And I believe that Congress has passed more
than a few unconstitutional statutes, some of which have been signed by Presidents
and upheld by the Supreme Court. There is much room for reasonable debate about
these issues and about such issues as how much deference each branch of government
should give to constitutional decisions reached by the others. But such debates are not
usefully advanced either by the ABA Report's shoddy legal analysis or by its hyster-
ical claim that President Bush's signing statements constitute a threat to "the rule of
law and our constitutional system of separation of powers. 82
Let us suppose that a President really did seriously abuse his position, for example
by systematically using dishonest interpretations of the law as a fig leaf for the exercise
of an unconstitutional line-item veto or for the exercise of a power to repeal existing
statutes by executive fiat. That might trigger a truly serious constitutional confron-
tation, and if it did there can be little doubt who would get "the last word." Congress,
after all, still has the power of impeachment. But Congress has been very cautious
about using this power to enforce its interpretations of the Constitution, and the
impeachment of Andrew Johnson suggests why this caution is quite appropriate. 83
Johnson's trial in the Senate may also serve as a useful reminder of what a real con-
stitutional crisis looks like. Had he been convicted, what the ABA calls "our constitu-
tional system of separation of powers" might indeed have been profoundly altered.
82 AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 5.
83 President Johnson was impeached purportedly for removing an executive officer in de-
fiance of the Tenure of Office Act, and he narrowly escaped conviction in the Senate. Decades
later, the Supreme Court concluded (rightly, in my view) that President Johnson had interpreted
the Constitution correctly. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175-76 (1926).
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The eminentoes who signed the ABA Report, and many others as well, no doubt
find President Bush's constitutional views and his signing statements highly offensive.
But offending your political opponents, or an organized interest group like the ABA,
is not quite the same as threatening the rule of law and the separation of powers.
And even if one assumes that some of Bush's critics have the purest motives and the
better of some of the arguments, it does not follow that the mistakes Bush may be
making are any real danger to the republic. If this episode suggests that there is any
threat at all to anything important, perhaps it is this: by crying wolf about presidential
signing statements, the ABA and its prestigious enablers have made it less likely that
they will be taken seriously if they ever have occasion to warn the nation about a
genuine threat to the constitutional order.
